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I. THE FIRST SKETCH
The fashion industry thrives because of the consuming public's
desire to be affiliated with appealing brands. Some of these coveted
brands are best identified by particular colors-for example, Tiffany &
Co.'s blue, Hermes's orange, and Christian Louboutin's red. Others are
internationally known for specific designs that incorporate color-such
as Missoni's vibrant patterns. While these colors may be well-
recognized symbols of specific brands, and thus deserving of
trademark protection, designers rely on a broad and unrestricted
array of colors in order to continue conjuring up the latest trends for
each new season. Due to these often-competing interests inherent to
the industry, fashion designers seeking protection for their single-
color trademarks or their identifying use of colors in a design
encounter significant challenges.
The Supreme Court, echoing Congress's intent to define
trademark broadly, denied a per se exclusion to the protection of
single-color trademarks,' but perhaps the fashion industry's
fundamental dependence on color renders the protection of single-color
marks particularly problematic. This is the issue at the heart of the
recent Christian Louboutin, S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent America, Inc.
litigation, in which the Second Circuit held that designer Christian
Louboutin's "Red Sole Mark" constitutes a valid trademark, but only
when the red on the sole is in contrast to the remainder of the shoe. 2
This partial victory for the plaintiff-designer leaves in its wake
1. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995).
2. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 212
(2d Cir. 2012).
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unresolved questions about single-color fashion marks and the
potential for increased intellectual property protection for the fashion
industry in general.
For better or for worse, fashion designers and manufacturers
are limited in their menu of intellectual property options. Professor
Susan Scafidi, advocating for heightened intellectual property
protection for fashion design, highlights the ever-increasing challenges
faced by the industry. 3 Advancements in technology and global
economic shifts, which facilitate increased production of high-quality
counterfeit goods, should be met with increased protection for
designers.4 Permitting protection of fashion marks through a more
flexible trademark analysis is a small step toward remedying the
dearth of intellectual property protection.
This Note argues that single-color marks and related product
designs that identify fashion brands should be granted trademark or
trade dress protection, despite serving simultaneous aesthetic and
source-identifying functions. Part II outlines the basic requirements of
trademark and trade dress law (distinctiveness and nonfunctionality),
and details the current protection afforded to color marks and fashion-
product features. Part III looks at the recent Louboutin decisions from
the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit, and then
analyzes the possibility of protecting single-color fashion marks, such
as Louboutin's Red Sole Mark. Such analysis involves a review of the
arguments and policies supporting such protection, as well as the
doctrine of functionality that dangerously cuts against it. Part IV
offers a solution that seeks to sufficiently preserve fashion's necessary
foundations of creativity and free competition while still incentivizing
the creation of successful marks such as Louboutin's Red Sole Mark.
Limiting the scope of the trademark is essential to this solution and to
the survival of a single-color mark in the face of the functionality
doctrine. Lastly, the solution includes a relaxed aesthetic functionality
framework, one that properly balances a mark's aesthetic appeal and
source-identifying functions.
II. WHAT'S "IN": A LOOK AT CURRENT TRADEMARK LAW
Fashion is indisputably a "big business";5 estimated annual
revenues for the industry total $350 billion domestically and $862
3. Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Fashion Design, in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND INFORMATION WEALTH 115, 125 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007).
4. Id. at 125-26.
5. Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Property's
Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 954 (2010).
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billion worldwide.6 These numbers reveal that most consumers
interact with the industry on an almost daily basis.7 Despite the jaw-
dropping annual revenues and the inarguable impact fashion has on
society, the United States offers the industry only limited intellectual
property protection.' This inconsistency between commercial success
and U.S. legal protection is highlighted by the fact that, year after
year, sales claimed by the fashion industry surpass sales of books,
movies, and music combined-those industries are often compared to
the fashion industry, but enjoy far greater intellectual property
protection.9
Patent and copyright laws protect some components of fashion,
but many of the designs and other aesthetic elements are largely
unprotected. The fashion industry's inherent preference for aesthetics
over pure function, coupled with the constant redefining of what is
"in," makes patent law an ill-suited vehicle for design protection.
Although design patents10 may protect innovative shoe and accessory
designs," most clothing designs are "re-workings" of past trends and
therefore fail the statutory requirement of novelty.12 Further, the
lengthy patent application process and its attendant prohibitive costs
do not render this body of intellectual property law a practical option
for designers who turn out new products with each new season.13
6. Id.
7. C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture and Economics of Fashion, 61
STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1148 (2009).
8. See Scafidi, supra note 3, at 118-19 (providing an account of the failed legislative
attempts throughout the twentieth century to augment intellectual property protection for
fashion designs); see also Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 5, at 969 (detailing current lack of
protection for fashion industry).
9. Hemphill & Suk, supra note 7, at 1148 & n.1.
10. Design patents cover "any new, original and ornamental design for an article of
manufacture." 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2006).
11. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. D571,551 (filed June 6, 2006) (DC Shoes, Inc. patent for the
ornamental design for an outsole and midsole for a shoe).
12. Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and
Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1704 (2006); Emma Yao Xia, The
New Trend: Protecting American Fashion Designs Through National Copyright Measures, 28
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 417, 429 (2010). In addition to the novelty requirement, innovations
seeking patent protection must satisfy the difficult statutory requirements of utility and non-
obviousness. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (utility requirement); id. § 102 (novelty requirement); id. § 103
(non-obviousness requirement).
13. Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 5, at 955; see also Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 12,
at 1704 (indicating that the application process may take up to eighteen months). According to a
2007 survey, by the time a patent is granted (which itself is extremely uncertain), an applicant
could see total costs exceeding twenty thousand dollars. Preserving Your Patent Rights, MIT
TECH. LICENSING OFFICE, http://web.mit.edultlo/www/community/preserving-patent-rights.
html#controlling-costs Gast visited Jan. 15, 2013).
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Copyright law, the realm of intellectual property created
primarily to protect original works of art, also fails to provide uniform
and adequate protection for fashion designs.14 The Federal Copyright
Act expressly lists "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" as eligible
for copyright protection.'6 Although fashion designs seem to fit easily
within these enumerated categories, courts have classified clothing as
a "useful article" having an "intrinsic utilitarian function that is not
merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey
information," and therefore have denied copyright protection.16
Recently, Congress has been open to providing increased, albeit
limited, copyright protection to fashion designers: in September of
2012, the Innovative Design Protection Act of 2012 ("IDPA") passed
the Senate Judiciary Committee.17 The IDPA would provide three
years of protection for original fashion designs and would require the
design's owner to provide an alleged infringer with at least twenty-one
days' written notice before instituting an action for infringement.18
However, previous unsuccessful legislative attempts to increase
protection for the industry require one to be wary of the ultimate fate
of the IDPA.19
14. Entire museums, the very homes of renowned works of art, are dedicated to fashion.
Recently, the late Alexander McQueen's most ambitious designs were on display at the
Metropolitan Museum of Art. See Diane Cardwell, Waiting Hours to See the McQueen Exhibit, in
a Line Not Unlike a Runway, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/08
/nyregion/alexander-mcqueen-exhibition-at-metropolitan-museum-of-art-draws-thousands.html.
15. Under the statute, copyright protection will be granted to "original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression," which includes the following non-exclusive list of
eligible works: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including accompanying words; (3) dramatic
works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5)
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7)
sound recordings; and (8) architectural works. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
16. Works of art in these categories are entitled to protection "only if, and only to the
extent that, [their] design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of
the article." 17 U.S.C. § 101. According to the Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein, copyright's
doctrine of separability provides potential copyright protection for those artistic elements that
are conceptually or physically independent from the function of the useful article. 347 U.S. 201,
213-14 (1954). For the fashion industry, this could include images or patterns that adorn the
clothing.
17. Karen A. Butcher et al., Design Protection Bill Sent On for Senate Vote, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAWFLASH (Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 28, 2012, at 1,
available at http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/IPLFFashionDesignProtectionBillVotedOut
OfSenate_28sepl2.pdf.
18. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE-S. 3523: INNOVATIVE DESIGN PROTECTION ACT
OF 2012 (2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/s3523.pdf.
19. Congress declined to adopt the proposed Design Piracy Prohibition Act (H.R. 2196) and
the Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act (S. 3728). LYDIA PALLAS LOREN &
JOSEPH ScoTT MILLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 343 (Semaphore
Press, version 2.2 2011).
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Considering these current shortcomings of U.S. intellectual
property law, this Note argues that trademark law is the appropriate
vehicle for addressing the fashion industry's need for increased
protection.
A. What Are Trademarks and Trade Dress?
Trademark law is foremost aimed at protecting the consumer. 20
It both decreases consumer search costs and encourages expenditures
in quality, as it is the uniform and dependable quality across products,
time, and consumers that allows a trademark to function as a
successful source identifier. 21 For example, when a fashion-conscious
consumer spots the interlocking "L & V" monogram on a brown
leather handbag, she immediately recognizes the symbol as that of
Louis Vuitton and can expect a high-quality and expensive product.
By granting a source such as Louis Vuitton the exclusive right to use a
particular source-identifying symbol within commerce, trademark law
protects consumers from confusion and protects brand owners by
prohibiting others from exploiting the goodwill of a particular
trademark.
The Lanham Act, passed in 1946, governs federal trademark
law. 2 2 A trademark includes "any word, name, symbol, or device, or
any combination thereof used by a person . .. in commerce ... to
identify and distinguish his or her goods . .. and to indicate the source
of the goods, even if that source is unknown."23 The Supreme Court
has interpreted "any" to evidence Congress's intent to define
trademark broadly, and courts continue to apply this definition
20. See Richard J. Berman, Color Me Bad: A New Solution to the Debate Over Color
Trademark Registration, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 111, 133-34 (1994) (stating that consumer
protection is favored over competitors' interest in exclusive use); Cotropia & Gibson, supra note
5, at 966 (arguing that trademark law is more about regulating deceptive means of competition
than providing incentives for innovation); see also Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc.,
469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) (noting the facilitation of commerce and protection of consumers as the
principal purposes behind the Lanham Act); Diane E. Moir, Trademark Protection of Color Alone:
How and When Does a Color Develop Secondary Meaning and Why Color Marks Can Never Be
Inherently Distinctive, 27 TOURO L. REV. 407, 411 (2011) ("The primary purpose of trademark
law is to 'provide[] national protection of trademarks in order . . . to protect the ability of
consumers to distinguish among competing producers.'" (quoting Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. at 198)).
21. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78
TRADEMARK REP. 267, 270-71 (1988).
22. Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129
(2006)).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
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accordingly when analyzing the validity of a mark. 24 Indeed, both the
United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") and courts
have extended trademark protection to a variety of "symbols" or
"devices" including colors, shapes, sounds, and even particular
scents. 26
This broad definition also embraces packaging, dressing, or
design. These elements, which contribute to the total image of the
product, are referred to as "trade dress," which can in some instances
constitute symbols or devices indicating a source. 26 Trade dress is
typically protected as an unregistered mark under a Lanham Act
action for false designation of origin. 27 Trade dress can cover features
such as "size, shape, color or color combinations, textures, graphics, or
even particular sales techniques."28 Examples include a toy's
packaging, the design of a restaurant, and even a clothing design.
Similar to trademarks, some trade dress elements signal a product's
source. In other words, when the requisite elements are satisfied,
trade dress may serve the identical function as a registered trademark
and will be protected as such.29 However, to serve as a valid source
identifier, a trademark or trade dress must be both distinctive and
nonfunctional.
B. Requirements for a Valid Trademark or Trade Dress
The USPTO makes the initial determination of whether to
register a trademark; once registered and if challenged, courts
determine whether to uphold protection against an alleged
infringement. In fulfilling their respective roles, both institutions
must first decide whether the particular "word, name, symbol, or
device" is actually a valid mark.30 A valid trademark must be
24. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) ("Since human beings
might use as a 'symbol' or 'device' almost anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning, this
language, read literally, is not restrictive.").
25. See id. (drawing upon examples of nontraditional marks such as the Coca-Cola bottle,
NBC's three chimes, and the scent of plumeria blossoms on sewing thread to indicate the broad
definition of "trademark").
26. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1125; Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 764-65 & n.1
(1992).
28. John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983).
29. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd. v. Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 338 (7th Cir. 1998).
30. See Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 790 (5th Cir. 1983)
("The threshold issue in any action for trademark infringement is whether the word or phrase is
initially registerable or protectable."), abrogated by KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting
Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004).
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distinctive in the marketplace and nonfunctional. 31 This Section
focuses on the requirements as they pertain to single-color marks
within the fashion industry.3 2
1. Distinctiveness: Inherent or Acquired Secondary Meaning
A trademark will be initially approved by the USPTO, and
subsequently upheld by the courts, based in part on its degree of
distinctiveness.33 Courts have relied loosely on the language of the
Lanham Act to identify four categories of ascending distinctiveness
under which potential trademarks may be characterized: (1) generic,
(2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) arbitrary or fanciful.3 4 Generic
marks, those that "connote the 'basic nature of articles or services'
rather than the more individualized characteristics of a particular
product," never warrant protection.35 On the other hand, suggestive,
arbitrary, and fanciful marks are inherently distinctive and do not
require evidence of acquired distinctiveness:36 "[B]ecause of the nature
of the designation and the context in which [they are] used,
prospective purchasers are likely to perceive [them] as a designation
that, in the case of a trademark, identifies goods or services produced
or sponsored by a particular person ....
Courts have held that both single-color marks and clothing
designs constituting trade dress are descriptive. 38 A descriptive mark
"'identifies a characteristic or quality of an article or service,' such as
31. See, e.g., Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 772-73 (9th Cir.
1981) ("The physical details and designs of a product may be protected under the Lanham Act if
these features are 'non-functional' and they have acquired a secondary [meaning].").
32. Due to the fact that a court's analysis of the validity of a registered mark is for the most
part identical to its analysis of trade dress, the following applies to both related bodies of law.
33. Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 790.
34. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
35. Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 790 (quoting Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co.,
494 F.2d 3, 11 (5th Cir. 1974)); see also Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9 ("A generic term is
one that refers, or has come to be understood as referring, to the genus of which the particular
product is a species."). An example of a generic term would be the word "apple" for the fruit itself.
36. Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 791. A suggestive term "requires imagination, thought and
perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of the goods." Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at
11. An example of a suggestive mark is "Coppertone" for sunscreen. An arbitrary term is one that
applies a common word in an unfamiliar way, whereas a fanciful term is a word invented solely
for its use as a trademark. Id. at 11 n. 12. The term "Apple" for computer products is an example
of an arbitrary mark. See Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 464 (4th Cir. 1996).
37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13(a) (1995).
38. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 216 (2000); Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995).
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its color, odor, function, dimensions, or ingredients."9 While
descriptive marks are not inherently distinctive, and therefore do not
automatically warrant protection, such marks are valid if they attain
secondary meaning in the minds of consumers. 40 A mark or trade
dress owner establishes secondary meaning by showing that, "in the
minds of the public, the primary significance of a product feature or
term is to identify the source of the product rather than the product
itself."4'
Direct evidence, such as consumer testimony and surveys, and
circumstantial evidence, such as advertising campaigns and
expenditures and sales reports, are required in order to establish
secondary meaning.42 The USPTO and various circuits have devised
nonexhaustive lists of factors to aid in the determination of secondary
meaning.43 For example, in Marketing Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix
Devices, Inc., the Sixth Circuit looked to seven factors: (1) direct
consumer testimony; (2) consumer surveys; (3) exclusivity, length, and
manner of use; (4) amount and manner of advertising; (5) amount of
sales and number of customers; (6) established place in market; and
(7) proof of intentional copying.44 The Supreme Court held that single-
color marks required a showing of secondary meaning in Qualitex Co.
39. Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 790 (internal citation omitted); see also Abercrombie & Fitch,
537 F.2d at 11 ("A term is descriptive if it forthwith conveys an immediate idea of the
ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the goods."). An example of a descriptive mark would
include "Aloe" in reference to products containing gel from the aloe vera plant. See Aloe Cr~me
Labs, Inc. v. Milsan, Inc., 423 F.2d 845, 850 (5th Cir. 1970).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006) ("[N]othing herein shall prevent the registration of a mark
used by the applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce.");
Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 790.
41. Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938).
42. Int'l Kennel Club of Chi., Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1085 (7th Cir. 1988).
43. See, e.g., Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 541 (5th Cir. 1998) (utilizing
a seven-factor test to determine whether secondary meaning had been achieved). The USPTO
uses a similar multi-factor test to determine whether a color mark has acquired the requisite
secondary meaning: (1) whether the use of the color is common in the relevant segment of the
market in question; (2) the product's sale volume; (3) whether publicity directly captures the
customer's attention with respect to the color of the product; (4) whether the color is also used in
promotional articles; (5) whether consumers associate the color with the nature of the product;
and (6) whether the color serves some utilitarian purpose. Glenda Labadie-Jackson, Through the
Looking Hole of the Multi-Sensory Trademark Rainbow: Trademark Protection of Color Per Se
Across Jurisdictions: The United States, Spain, and the European Union, 7 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. &
BuS. 91, 99 (2008) (citing Midge M. Hyman & Hannah Y. Cheng, Registrability and
Enforceability of Non-Traditional Trademarks in the United States, in PRACTISING LAW INST.,
PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 6-9
(2005)).
44. Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929, 937 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing
Sassafras Enters., Inc. v. Roshco, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 1, 7 (N.D. Ill. 1996)), rev'd on other grounds,
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
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v. Jacobson Products Co.; it held the same for clothing design in Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc.
a. Qualitex: Single-Color Marks
The Lanham Act does not expressly prohibit the registration of
a color as a trademark. 45 The preamble of section two of the Lanham
Act states that "[no trademark . .. shall be refused registration on the
principal register on account of its nature" unless specific enumerated
exceptions apply.46 Early judicial decisions responded to this statutory
silence in a variety of ways-ranging from absolutely prohibiting
protection,47 to, allowing protection in limited circumstances, 48and
finally to declining to establish per se prohibition against protecting
color alone.49
The Supreme Court responded to this circuit split in 1995 in
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., holding that color is sometimes
capable of satisfying the basic legal requirements for trademark
protection and that "no special legal rules prevent color alone from
serving as a trademark."50 The plaintiff, Qualitex, a manufacturer of
green-gold dry-cleaning press pads, sued its competitor, Jacobson, for
unfair competition and trademark infringement after discovering
Jacobson was selling identically colored press pads to the same
distributors.5'
The Court concluded that a color is not inherently distinctive
because it does not automatically signal to consumers a specific
brand.52 Nonetheless, it found that a color could serve as a valid
trademark (i.e., it could constitute a "symbol" or "device") upon a
45. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (explicitly enumerating marks that are not eligible for protection).
Even before enactment of the Lanham Act in 1946, when registration of color marks was
prohibited, some courts granted owners of color marks protection against unfair competition
upon proof of secondary meaning. In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1118-19
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (citing Yellow Cab Transit Co. v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co., 147 F.2d 407
(6th Cir. 1945); Clifton Mfg. Co. v. Crawford-Austin Mfg. Co., 12 S.W.2d 1098 (Tex. Civ. App.
1929)).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1052; Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1119 (stating and arguing that "[color is
not such an exception").
47. See NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1028 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that
the blue color of sugar substitute packets could not be protected as trade dress).
48. See Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1128 (finding that the color pink may serve as a
trademark for insulation).
49. See Master Distribs., Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219, 224 (8th Cir. 1993) (refusing to
establish per se prohibition against standalone color trademarks).
50. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 161, 174 (1995); see also Moir, supra
note 20, at 412-13 (describing Qualitex as the "emergence of color marks").
51. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 161.
52. Id. at 162-63.
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showing of secondary meaning. 53 Here, consumers associated the
green-gold color of press pads with the Qualitex brand specifically;
therefore, the color had acquired secondary meaning.54
b. Wal-Mart: Product Design
Some forms of trade dress, such as product packaging or the
design of a restaurant, may be inherently distinctive.55 However, the
Supreme Court, in Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Samara Brothers, expressly
distinguished clothing design from those categories of trade dress.56
Refusing to protect the plaintiffs designs as valid trade dress, the
Court held that product design is entitled to protection only if it has
acquired secondary meaning because, as is the case with color,
consumers are not predisposed to equate the feature with the source:
" [C]onsumers are aware of the reality that.. . even the most unusual
of product designs . . . is intended not to identify the source, but to
render the product itself more useful or more appealing." 7 Thus, in
order to serve as valid trade dress, a particular fashion design must
create an "association in buyers' minds between the alleged mark and
a single source."58 However, no amount of evidence of acquired
distinctiveness will succeed in validating a mark or product design if it
is merely a functional attribute of the product.59
2. The Functionality Doctrine
A finding of functionality will trump any evidence of
distinctiveness.60 Thus, many courts will treat this doctrine as a
53. Id. at 163.
54. Id. at 174.
55. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 784-85 (1992) (finding that the
design of a restaurant could be protected as trade dress and may be inherently distinctive).
56. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 213, 216 (2000). Further, "[t]o the
extent there are close cases, we believe that courts should err on the side of caution and classify
ambiguous trade dress as product design, thereby requiring secondary meaning." Id. at 215.
57. Id. at 213; see also Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280
F.3d 619, 637 (6th Cir. 2002) (reiterating that, after Samara Bros., product designs may only
meet the Lanham Act's distinctiveness requirement upon a showing of secondary meaning).
58. 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15:5
(4th ed. 1996).
59. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34-35 (2001) (reasoning
that investment made to encourage association with a particular feature is futile if the feature is
functional).
60. See, e.g., In re R.M. Smith, Inc., 734 F.2d 1482, 1484-85 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("Evidence of
distinctiveness is of no avail to counter a de jure functionality rejection."); see also TrafFix, 532
U.S. at 34-35 ("The Lanham Act, furthermore, does not protect trade dress in a functional design
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threshold issue to secondary meaning, refusing to address the latter
altogether upon concluding that a mark is functional. 61 The burden of
proof shifts depending on whether a mark is registered with the
USPTO. If the mark in question is unregistered-as is the case with
most trade dress-the party seeking protection carries the burden of
proving nonfunctionality. 62 Alternatively, registration with the
USPTO affords mark owners a presumption of validity and shifts the
burden of proving functionality to the opponent attempting to
invalidate the mark.63 Due to the fact that valid unregistered trade
dress and registered trademarks are treated the same under the
Lanham Act,64 and "because evidence of functionality is equally
available to both parties,"65 this burden shifting has little effect on the
analysis in this Note.
So what exactly is the functionality doctrine?66 In Inwood
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., the Supreme Court held
that the blue color of plaintiffs pill was a functional product feature
for patients, doctors, and hospitals in that it prevented commingling of
medications, assisted drug identification in emergency situations, and
signaled a therapeutic effect.67 Creating what is now referred to as
utilitarian functionality, the Court described a functional product
feature as that which is "essential to the use or purpose of the article
or ... affects the cost or quality of the article."68 In general, there is no
great discrepancy in the lower courts' applications of this doctrine;
courts can fairly readily identify a potential trademark or trade dress
feature's necessity or its effect on the product's cost or quality.69
simply because an investment has been made to encourage the public to associate a particular
functional feature with a single manufacturer or seller.").
61. See, e.g., Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 344 (9th Cir. 1952) ("[The design
being a functional feature of the china, we find it unnecessary to inquire into the adequacy of the
showing made as to secondary meaning of the designs.").
62. See TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29 (stating that Congress codified this burden of proving
nonfunctionality in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3)).
63. See Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1981)
(noting that registration establishes a presumption that the mark serves the nonfunctional
purpose of source identification).
64. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd. v. Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 338 (7th Cir. 1998).
65. Id. at 340.
66. Landes and Posner provide a useful, albeit incomplete, example to aid the
understanding of the functionality doctrine: "The maker of a tire could not trademark its circular
shape but could trademark an irregularly shaped hubcap." Landes & Posner, supra note 21, at
295.
67. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853 (1982).
68. Id. at 850 n.10.
69. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938) (finding pillow shape
of "Shredded Wheat" to be functional in that "the cost of the biscuit would be increased and its
high quality lessened if some other form were substituted"); Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bits
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Furthermore, since utility is a fundamental requirement of patent
law, it is strong evidence of functionality if a particular product
feature was at one time claimed under a utility patent.70 Though it
will be an uphill battle, a mark owner can rebut the presumption of
utilitarian functionality by showing that the feature in question is
"merely an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the device."71
Thirteen years after Inwood, the Supreme Court, in Qualitex,
supplemented its existing standard by addressing aesthetic
functionality.7 2 The Court held that the green-gold, single-color mark
for laundry press pads could serve as a valid trademark unless
"exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a significant
non-reputation-related disadvantage."7 3 Without further guidance,
lower courts have created a variety of inconsistent and inadequate
standards for analyzing aesthetic functionality.
In TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., the Court
affirmed the coexistence of both subdoctrines of functionality.74
Declaring plaintiffs dual-spring design for weather-resistant sign
stands to be an attribute of traditional or utilitarian functionality, as
evidenced by the product's expired patent, the Court did not find it
necessary to further analyze whether there was a competitive need for
the feature.75
Despite attempts by the Supreme Court to further clarify the
concept of functionality, this doctrine is still fraught with uncertainty
and continues to be inconsistently applied throughout the lower
courts-especially in cases dealing with color and fashion designs.76
Distribution, LLC, 369 F.3d 1197, 1206 (11th Cir. 2004) (concluding that the size and shape of
ice cream beads were functional attributes because they contributed to the product's taste and
consistency, and because this form facilitated quick freezing of the product).
70. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29-30 (2001) (finding a
dual-spring design to be a functional attribute, as it was the "central advance claimed in the
expired utility patents").
71. Id. at 30.
72. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995). The doctrine of
aesthetic functionality was first espoused by the Ninth Circuit in Pagliero v. Wallace China Co.,
198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952).
73. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165.
74. See 532 U.S. at 33 (applying the "traditional" rule set forth in Inwood prior to the
"competitive necessity" or aesthetic rule summarized in Qualitex).
75. Id. at 34 ('The dual-spring design is not an arbitrary flourish in the configuration of
MDI's product; it is the reason the device works. Other designs need not be attempted.").
76. See Mark P. McKenna, (Dys)Functionality, 48 Hous. L. REV. 823, 824 (2011)
(describing the doctrine as "quite inconsistently applied").
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a. Functionality in Color and Fashion
While color is not per se functional,77 the USPTO and various
courts have denied trademark protection on the grounds of
functionality in several instances, such as when color served to
distinguish medications,78 to indicate flavor,79 and to blend with the
natural color of human skin.80 Additionally, protection will not be
afforded to the natural color of a product, because such a feature is
essential to the product's use.8s Lastly, courts have suggested that
color used to avoid stains or to diminish the appearance of "wear and
tear" on a product serves a functional purpose. 82 These examples show
that single-color marks must overcome various obstacles in order to
gain protection; such obstacles may be even greater for industries that
fundamentally rely on aesthetic appeal, such as fashion.
Although articles of clothing no doubt serve functional
purposes such as protection and warmth, it is aesthetic preferences,
dictated by both personal choice and a desire to follow a specific trend,
that lead the individual to dress himself or herself in a particular
fashion. Color lies at the heart of this aesthetic choice. 83 Furthermore,
due to the rapid changes in trends, a particular color can be "in" one
season and then "out" mere months later.84 It is color's central role
within the fashion industry that makes protection via trademark law
a contentious issue.
77. See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165 ("[T]he fact that sometimes color is not essential to the
product's use or purpose and does not affect cost or quality-indicates that the doctrine of
'functionality' does not create an absolute bar to the use of color alone as a mark.").
78. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853 (1982) (finding color to be
functional in that it was used to differentiate medications from one another, provided
therapeutic effects to patients, and facilitated quick dispensing in emergency situations).
79. See Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bits Distribution, LLC, 369 F.3d 1197, 1203-04 (11th
Cir. 2004) (reasoning colors of product were functional because they indicated the different
flavors of ice cream).
80. See In re Ferris Corp., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587, 1589 (T.T.A.B. 2001) ("There is no question
that 'flesh color' for wound dressings serves the utilitarian purpose of blending well with the
natural color of human skin."). The Board also reasoned that certification of the trademark in
question would negatively affect competitors. Id. at 1591.
81. Master Distribs., Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219, 224 (8th Cir. 1993).
82. See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 166 (arguing that color in general was needed to avoid
noticeable stains, but ultimately finding particular green-gold color was not essential, since other
colors could be used).
83. See Marilyn Revell Delong, Color in Dress, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CLOTHING AND
FASHION 280, 282 (Valerie Steele ed., 2005) (stating that color is the "most important aesthetic
criterion in consumer preference").
84. Oliver Horton, Upping the Color Quotient, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 1, 2008, http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/10/01/style/Oliht-rcolor.1.16608890.html (detailing the trend in the fashion
industry of using an increased range of colors).
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To date, color used in fashion design has been granted limited
trademark protection. In Keds Corp. v. Renee International Trading
Corp., the First Circuit found that the blue rectangle placed on
plaintiffs shoes was a valid mark because the shape was
nonfunctional and the mark had acquired secondary meaning.85 More
recently, in Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., the
Second Circuit held that Vuitton's "Multicolore" mark, consisting of its
famous monogram design plus thirty-three bright colors, was a valid
mark.86 However, Vuitton did not claim separate protection of the
colors alone, and the holding of validity was largely based on the
distinctiveness already enjoyed by the widely popular monogram motif
design.87 Other examples from the fashion industry in which color has
served as part of a valid trademark include Burberry's "Check"
pattern88 and Prada's red longitudinal heel stripe.89
From these few examples, it appears that trademark protection
of specific colors has been afforded to fashion brands based on the
synergy or arrangement of the color as part of a mark, rather than the
use of color independently. 90 Thus, considering color marks within the
context of the product's design is similar to trade dress analysis. For
the purposes of this Note, analysis of the validity of single-color
fashion marks encompasses both registered single-color trademarks
and the identifying use of a single color as an element of fashion
design or trade dress. The Second Circuit's recent holding in Christian
Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent, which granted Louboutin protection
of its Red Sole Mark, simultaneously signals a small victory for the
fashion industry and a continued headache for those parsing through
the functionality doctrine.
85. Keds Corp. v. Renee Int'l Trading Corp., 888 F.2d 215, 221 (1st Cir. 1989). This case
serves merely to illustrate an early instance of protection of a mark including a specific color. It
should be noted that Keds Corp. was decided prior to the Supreme Court's ruling of single-color
protection in Qualitex and, therefore, its deliberate choice to stay away from the issue of
trademarking color alone is no longer relevant. However, the Court did acknowledge that the
"color only" issue was previously before the USPTO and that the USPTO decided that there was
secondary meaning in and of itself. Id.
86. Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3d 108, 115-16 (2d Cir. 2006).
87. Id. at 115.
88. Registration No. 1,241,222. The Southern District of New York confirmed Burberry's
"Check" mark as a valid trademark in Burberry Ltd. v. Euro Moda, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 5781(CM),
2009 WL 1675080, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2009).
89. Registration No. 2,851,315.
90. Christian Louboutin SA. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 451
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint
Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012).
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III. CURRENT ISSUES SURROUNDING THE PROTECTION OF SINGLE-
COLOR FASHION TRADEMARKS
The Supreme Court's holdings in Qualitex and Wal-Mart
inform the analysis of the validity of single-color fashion marks; such
a trademark or element of trade dress lies at the intersection of color
and product design. The fashion industry's unique reliance on
creativity and aesthetics may complicate this analysis, but it should
not give reason to categorically deny protection to single-color fashion
marks. This Part begins with a discussion of contemporary litigation
surrounding this issue. It then supports and expands upon the Second
Circuit's general holding in Louboutin that single-color trademarks
within the fashion industry may be protected under certain
circumstances.
A. A Battle in Six-Inch Heels: Christian Louboutin v. Yves Saint
Laurent
In 1992, designer Christian Louboutin began coloring the
outsoles of his high-fashion women's shoes a glossy, vivid red.91 In an
interview with USA Today, the designer explained his decision to use
the particular color: "[I]t is the color of love. It's the color of passion."92
Elsewhere, Louboutin has described his choice as a way to give the
shoes "energy," because red is "engaging, flirtatious, memorable ...
sexy."93 Women lust after the coveted (and pricey) red-soled shoes,
making Louboutin a world-renowned name in the high-fashion shoe
industry.94 The brand's fame derives largely from the red outsole
itself: interested consumers can instantly recognize the brand when
they see a red-soled shoe gracing the red carpet or the pages of fashion
publications. 95 The USPTO approved Louboutin's registration of its
91. Id. at 447.
92. Cindy Clark, Christian Louboutin's Red-Soled Shoes Are Red-Hot, USA TODAY, Dec. 25,
2007, http://www.usatoday.com/life/lifestyle/fashion/2007-12-25-louboutin-shoesN.htm.
93. Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 447.
94. Louboutin is estimated to sell approximately 240,000 pairs annually in the United
States, with prices ranging from $395 to as much as $6,000. The company's revenue for 2011 was
forecasted at $135 million. Lay Off My Red-Soled Shoes: Can a Colour Be a Trademark?, THE
ECONOMIST, Aug. 20, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21526357.
95. One journalist writes, 'Though many people can't pronounce his name (Lu-bu-TAHn),
his signature red sole is instantly recognizable ... . The red sole 'has given him an edge, because
it's a visible touch that brands him. Women tend to feel others notice, and it's a way of saying
you've got the shoe.' " Clark, supra note 92 (quoting Filipa Fino). The Lanham Act's broad
definition of trademark allows for protection "even if that source is unknown." 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(2006). The USPTO has reiterated this detail. In re Paramount Pictures Corp., 217 U.S.P.Q. 292,
293 (T.T.A.B. 1983) ("[I]t is immaterial whether the actual identity of the source is known.").
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"Red Sole Mark" in 2008.96 However, Louboutin's popularity and
commercial success initially failed to convince the Southern District of
New York that its Red Sole Mark warranted protection.
1. Fashion Faux Pas: Southern District of New York Decides Against
Louboutin
In April 2011, Christian Louboutin, S.A. sued competitor Yves
Saint Laurent America, Inc., asserting a violation of the Lanham Act
and New York law for its use of the color red on the outsoles of its
monochromatic Cruise 2011 collection. 97 The district court denied the
plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that
Louboutin's lacquered red color on its products' outsoles did not
warrant trademark protection under the Lanham Act.98
While the court acknowledged that Louboutin's red outsole had
acquired secondary meaning due to its public recognition, it denied
protection as a trademark on the grounds of functionality: "[I]n the
fashion industry, color serves ornamental and aesthetic functions vital
to robust competition."99 The court began its discussion with a narrow
interpretation of Qualitex,00 distinguishing the fashion industry's use
of color as predominantly aesthetic (i.e., serving non-trademark
functions), as compared to color marks used to identify industrial
products.' 0' Additionally, it found that Louboutin's use of color served
a utilitarian function because the red outsole affected the cost of the
product-that is, it increased the price of the shoes because a higher
manufacturing cost translates into a higher price for consumers,
which perpetuates the exclusivity associated with luxury goods.102
96. Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 448. Its certificate of registration, which included both a
verbal description and line drawing to show placement of the mark, stated, "The color(s) red
is/are claimed as a feature of the mark. The mark consists of a lacquered red sole on footwear.
The dotted lines are not part of the mark but are intended only to show placement of the mark."
Registration No. 3,361,597.
97. Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 448.
98. Id. at 457.
99. Id. at 449.
100. Id. at 450 ("In short, color can meet the legal requirements for a trademark if it 'act[s]
as a symbol that distinguishes a firm's goods and identifies their source, without serving any
other significant function.' " (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166
(1995)) (emphasis added)).
101. Id. at 451. ("The application of color to the product can be isolated to a single purpose:
to change the article's external appearance so as to distinguish one source from another. But,
whatever commercial purposes may support extending trademark protection to a single color for
industrial goods do not easily fit the unique characteristics and needs-the creativity, aesthetics,
taste, and seasonal change-that define production of articles of fashion.").
102. Id. at 454.
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Most damning, the court found Louboutin's use of red to be
aesthetically functional, because granting exclusive use of the color
red would significantly hinder competition due to the foreseeable
results of color depletion and shade confusion.103 Following the district
court's decision and Louboutin's subsequent interlocutory appeal to
the Second Circuit, support rallied around both parties in the media
and through the filing of amicus briefs; many understood that the
ultimate outcome in this case would have an impact reaching beyond
the fate of one luxury-shoe designer. 104
2. Tris Chic?: Second Circuit Holds Louboutin's Red Sole Mark Is a
Valid Trademark when Modified
While declaring that there is no per se prohibition of single-
color trademarks in the fashion industry (consistent with the seminal
holding in Qualitex), the Second Circuit held that Louboutin's Red
Sole Mark constituted a valid trademark only when used in contrast
with the remainder of the shoe; thus, to maintain protection, the court
modified the mark pursuant to § 1119 of Title 15 of the U.S. Code.105
As a result, Yves Saint Laurent's monochromatic shoe, which lacked
such a contrast, did not constitute an infringing use of Louboutin's
trademark. 06
103. Id. at 454-57.
104. Tiffany & Co. filed a brief in support of Louboutin, arguing the district court's per se
rule is unsubstantiated by both statutory and judicial precedent and that the court incorrectly
analyzed the issue under both facets of the functionality defense. Brief of Amicus Curiae Tiffany
(NJ) LLC and Tiffany & Co. in Support of Appellants' Appeal Seeking Reversal of the District
Court's Decision Denying Appellants' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 7-8, Christian
Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 11-
3303-cv). The International Trademark Association ("INTA") followed in filing its own brief in
support of Louboutin. The INTA argued that the court did not grant Louboutin the presumption
of validity warranted by its approved USPTO registration and therefore overbroadly construed
the registration as "the color red" rather than as "a lacquered red sole on footwear." Brief of
Amicus Curiae International Trademark Ass'n in Support of Vacatur and Remand at 6-15,
Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012)
(No. 11-3303-cv). It too argued that the court incorrectly applied the doctrine of aesthetic
functionality. Id. at 16. In support of Yves Saint Laurent, a group of American law professors has
argued for the legitimacy of the aesthetic functionality doctrine and the court's proper
application of such doctrine. Brief of Amicus Curiae Law Professors in Support of Defendants-
Counter-Claimants-Appellees and Urging Affirmance at 2-11, Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves
Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 11-3303-cv).
105. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 212
(2d Cir. 2012); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (2006) ("In any action involving a registered mark the
court may determine the right to registration, order the cancelation of registrations, in whole or
in part, restore canceled registrations, and otherwise rectify the register with respect to the
registrations of any party to the action." (emphasis added)).
106. Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 212.
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The court began by stating that in an infringement claim, the
mark owner must prove that (1) its mark is distinctive and (2) there is
a likelihood of consumer confusion between its mark and that of the
alleged infringer. 07 If successfully demonstrated, the opponent may
still prevail upon proving the affirmative defense of functionality-in
other words, by proving that the mark in question is not a valid source
identifier, but rather serves a utilitarian or aesthetic function.os
The Second Circuit sought to clarify the district court's
incorrect understanding of the doctrine of aesthetic functionality-an
understanding that led the lower court to find that a single color could
never serve as a trademark within the fashion industry.109 Keeping in
mind the need to balance the competitive benefits of protecting source-
identifying aspects of a mark with the costs of precluding competitors
from using the feature, the court first formulated a standard for
analyzing the aesthetic functionality doctrine: "[A] mark is
aesthetically functional, and therefore ineligible for protection ...
where protection of the mark significantly undermines competitors'
ability to compete in the relevant market."110 Second, due to the very
fact-specific nature of the inquiry, it cautioned against "jumping to the
conclusion" that an aesthetic feature is functional merely because it
denotes the product's desirable source."1 Third, acknowledging the
central role of color within fashion, and the resulting difficulty in
applying the doctrine to fashion marks, the court reasoned that the
functionality defense does not guarantee competitors the greatest
range of creative choices, but rather allows them enough ability to
fairly compete within a given market. 112
Despite this comprehensive discussion of the functionality
doctrine, the court stopped short of applying its own analysis to the
facts at hand.113 Instead, by framing the "distinctiveness" prong as the
central question-the first in its construction of a prima facie
infringement claim-it avoided the functionality issue all together. 14
107. Id. at 216-17.
108. Id. Had this been an action under § 43(a) for trade dress infringement, the party
seeking protection would bear the burden of proving the design was nonfunctional. 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a)(3).
109. Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 223.
110. Id. at 222.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 223.
113. See id. at 224 ("[W~e need not, and do not, reach the issue[| of ... functionality at the
second stage of trademark infringement analysis described above.").
114. See id. at 217 (stating that confusion and functionality analysis is only carried out if a
trademark is first found to be "distinctive" (quoting Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke,
Inc., 454 F.3d 108, 115 (2d Cir. 2005))).
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Relying on statements from the parties, evidence of Louboutin's
advertising expenditures, media coverage, and consumer surveys, the
court stated that the red outsole had acquired secondary meaning or
distinctiveness as a "symbol" only when contrasted with the upper
part of the shoes: "[I]t is the contrast between the sole and the upper
that causes the sole to 'pop,' and to distinguish its creator." 15 In
emphasizing such contrast, and thereby highlighting the Red Sole
Mark in the context of the overall shoe design, the court implicitly
incorporated the trade dress analysis from Wal-Mart. With the issue
of the particular mark's functionality still somewhat unresolved, the
case was. remanded to the district court." 6 The following Section
supports and expands upon the Second Circuit's general holding that
single-color trademarks within the fashion industry may be protected.
B. Trend Setting: Clarifying Arguments in Favor of Protection of
Single-Color Fashion Trademarks
Louboutin provides a springboard for discussing the possibility
of granting the fashion industry increased intellectual property
protection through trademark and trade dress laws; this Section offers
support for the Second Circuit's holding. First, the broad definition of
trademark, as intended by Congress and applied by the Supreme
Court in Qualitex and Wal-Mart, affords protection for valid
trademarks within the fashion industry. Second, with respect to the
statutory requirement of distinctiveness, the fashion industry's "swift
cycle of innovation"'117 highlights those rare instances in which a single
color serves to identify a product's source beyond a mere seasonal
trend. Third, the often-lethal functionality doctrine should be
narrowly applied, to allow for the reality that fashion marks often
serve equally significant aesthetic and source-identifying roles.
1. Honoring the Lanham Act's Broad Definition of Trademark
One theme remains constant throughout the evolution of U.S.
trademark law: Congress has continually expanded the definition of
trademark."18 Under the Trademark Act of 1905, federal registration
115. Id. at 227.
116. Id. at 229.
117. Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 12, at 1691.
118. See Moir, supra note 20, at 409 (chronicling congressional amendments altering the
definition of the term trademark).
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was only available to arbitrary or fanciful words or symbols.119 The
Lanham Act eliminated this restrictive definition in 1946 and replaced
it with the broad construction of "any word, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof."120 This expansive definition is repeated in
additional sections of the Act: "No trademark ... shall be refused
registration on the principal register on account of its nature" unless
specific enumerated exceptions apply. 121 Further, Congress reiterated
the all-encompassing definition of trademark in a Senate Judiciary
Report regarding the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, stating it
"intentionally retain[ed] . . . the words 'symbol or device' so as not to
preclude the registration of colors, shapes, sounds or configurations
where they function as trademarks."122
Courts generally adhere to this broad definition. 123 In Park 'N
Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., the Supreme Court stated,
"Congress determined that a sound public policy requires that
trademarks should receive nationally the greatest protection that can
be given them."124 Specifically regarding single-color marks, courts
adopted an expansive definition in multiple cases. 125 In Qualitex, for
instance, the defendant argued that under pre-1946 precedent, color
alone did not warrant trademark protection.126 In response, the Court
insisted that such cases were irreconcilable with Congress's enactment
of the Lanham Act and liberalization of trademark law. 127 With regard
to clothing design, the Supreme Court again emphasized the "breadth
of the definition of marks" in Wal-Mart, stating that unregistered
clothing design could constitute valid trade dress upon a showing of
secondary meaning.128
The above legislative history and judicial opinions do not
categorically deny protection to single-color trademarks within any
particular industry. Rather, as the Second Circuit found in Qualitex,
the Supreme Court specifically forbade implementation of a per se
119. Trademark Act of 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-84, 33 Stat. 724 (repealed 1946); Moir, supra
note 20, at 409.
120. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
121. Id. § 1052.
122. Master Distribs., Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219, 224 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting S. REP.
No. 100-515, at 44 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5607) (alteration in original)
(emphasis added).
123. See supra Part II.A (describing the Supreme Court's adoption of a broad definition and
describing ways in which this construction has been applied).
124. 469 U.S. 189, 193 (1985) (quoting S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 6 (1946)) (emphasis added).
125. See supra Part II.B.2.
126. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 170-71 (1995).
127. Id. at 171.
128. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 209, 216 (2000).
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rule that would deny protection for the use of a single color as a
trademark in the context of a particular industry.129 Assuming a
single-color mark identifying a fashion brand is both distinctive (i.e., it
has acquired secondary meaning within the marketplace) and
nonfunctional, nothing about the fashion industry itself should
exclude such a mark from protection under the Lanham Act.
2. Color Cutting Across Seasons: Support for Secondary Meaning
Each season, a designer creates a fashion line around a
particular color theme. 130 While some designers choose their "color
story" based on inspiration,131 most rely on trend forecasts, which
create a somewhat mainstream scheme for a given season. 132 Most
colors cycle in and out of fashion; that is, designers rarely use a
specific color with such consistency as to make it indicative of the
brand. The rarity with which this actually occurs illuminates the need
for protection for the instances in which it does.
The Supreme Court reiterated intellectual property law's
default rule in TrafFix Devices: "[U]nless an intellectual property right
such as a patent or copyright protects an item, it will be subject to
copying."133 Some scholars argue that the fashion industry's success
and constant innovation are based somewhat on this general freedom
to copy.134 The reasoning behind this argument is that heightened
intellectual property protection (at least with regard to copyright)
would actually retard the production of new trends." 5 Originators
129. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 218
(2d Cir. 2012).
130. GINI STEPHENS FRINGS, FASHION: FROM CONCEPT TO CONSUMER 228 (9th ed. 2007).
131. EVELYN L. BRANNON, FASHION FORECASTING 156 (2d ed. 2005).
132. FRINGS, supra note 130, at 228; see also STEVEN BLEICHER, CONTEMPORARY COLOR
THEORY & USE 32-33 (2005) (discussing the widespread use of color forecasting within the
fashion industry). The Pantone Color Institute, a research group created by Pantone LLC,
studies seasonal color trends, providing those in the fashion industry with a summary of colors
used by top designers. See Pantone Fashion Color Report Fall 2012, PANTONE,
http://www.pantone.com/pages/fcr.aspx?pg-20948&ca=4&from=hpfeatures (last visited Feb. 21,
2012).
133. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001).
134. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 12, at 1689 ("[F]ashion firms continue to
innovate at a rapid clip, precisely the opposite behavior of that predicted by the standard
theory."); see also TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29 (reasoning that allowing competitors to copy in some
instances will lead to significant advances and innovations); Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 5, at
957 ("Fashion's low-IP status causes trends to cycle in and out more quickly, which increases the
demand for new fashions, which means more innovation and a greater supply of fashion goods
than would occur in the absence of unregulated copying.").
135. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 12, at 1727-28 (arguing copying promotes
innovation and benefits originators). But see Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 5, at 958 ('This is not
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would have no incentive to create new designs if downstream copying,
which makes a particular design widely available, was prohibited. 13 6
While these arguments seem logical as they pertain to
ephemeral trends, their reasoning is not applicable to instances in
which an identifying use of color has acquired distinctiveness in
consumers' minds due to its use season after season-like Louboutin's
red outsole.137 Such consistent use across products and throughout
seasons does not constitute a trend, and there is therefore no benefit
to the fashion industry's "swift cycle of innovation" when trademark
protection is denied in these cases.138 Consistent use across seasons
augments the argument that the use of color has obtained secondary
meaning-especially when contrasted with the majority of short-lived,
single-season color trends. 139 This determination of whether a color
has acquired secondary meaning appears relatively straightforward
when compared to the analysis required under the doctrine of
functionality.
3. Fashion and Function
As illustrated by the district court's holding in Louboutin v.
Yves Saint Laurent, owners of single-color fashion marks face their
to say that everyone in the industry would be worse off in the presence of strong intellectual
property rights. Leading designers in particular might do better if the fashion cycle were slower,
as they could increase their share of industry proceeds by licensing a single design . . . ."). This
difference in reasoning among those presumably arguing for low-IP protection in the fashion
industry further augments the lack of concrete bases against heightened protection.
136. Scafidi offers the following analysis:
[T]he cycle begins when high-status individuals or early adopters acquire an item.
That item becomes a social signaling device, provoking demand among lower status
individuals or outsiders who wish to emulate and perhaps interact with the original
purchasers. As more consumers purchase the item, however, it loses its signaling
value. This loss of value may be further exacerbated by third-party production of
knockoffs, which make a version of the item accessible and affordable to still more
aspirational consumers. Thus, the original individuals move on to new expensive or
rare objects of desire in order to differentiate themselves, and a fashion cycle is
complete.
See Scafidi, supra note 3, at 125.
137. Louboutin has been painting the bottom of his soles red since 1992. Such a practice in
no way can be considered a mere seasonal trend. See supra Part III.A.
138. Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 12, at 1691.
139. In Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. American Eagle Outfitters, Inc., though denying
protection due to functionality, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged "the reality of the clothing
industry" in finding that seasonal designs were "simply a reaction to seasonal changes." 280 F.3d
619, 633 n.11 (6th Cir. 2002). This willingness to consider seasonal designs eligible for trade
dress protection further supports a finding of secondary meaning in cases where such design
features (e.g., color) do not change with each passing season.
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greatest obstacle in overcoming the doctrine of functionality.140 The
Second Circuit's reluctance to apply its own functionality analysis to
Louboutin's Red Sole Mark further confirms the complexity of this
inquiry. The Supreme Court aptly stated this point in Qualitex: "The
functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to
promote competition by protecting a firm's reputation, from instead
inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control a
useful product feature."14 1
In TrafFix Devices, the Supreme Court articulated an
additional policy reason behind the functionality doctrine: to prevent
trademark law from serving as a backdoor method of perpetual
protection once the more limited protection of patent law (or similarly,
copyright law) expires.142 While this concern is not unwarranted, as
trademarks may be potentially afforded perpetual protection,143 the
Lanham Act's "use in commerce" requirement serves as a safeguard
against such an eternal monopoly.144 The nature of the fashion
industry dovetails with this "use in commerce" requirement. Since the
fashion industry and consumers rapidly dispose of trends, and
sometimes even brands in their entirety, it is unlikely that any brand
will remain popular with consumers forever. It is therefore improbable
that a single-color trademark will remain "in commerce" eternally.
As discussed above in Section II.B.2, the functionality doctrine
is commonly subdivided into utilitarian functionality and aesthetic
functionality. 145 This Section begins by analyzing the more uniformly
applied doctrine of utilitarian functionality. The rest of the Section is
devoted to the courts' divergent treatment of the doctrine of aesthetic
functionality, focusing on its application to color and fashion design.
140. See supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of the burden of proof with regard to
functionality.
141. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995); see also In re Morton-
Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (arguing that an owner's right to
protect a product feature is limited by "the need to copy ... [articles which are not protected by
patent or copyright], which is more properly termed the right to compete effectively" (emphasis
added)); Mitchell M. Wong, Note, The Aesthetic Functionality Doctrine and the Law of Trade-
Dress Protection, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1116, 1131-32 (1998) ("The rationale behind the
functionality doctrine is that the public interest in certain inventions or designs outweighs an
individual's right to use those inventions or designs as indicators of a product's source.").
142. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34 (2001) ("The Lanham Act
does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation in creating a particular device; that
is the purpose of the patent law and its period of exclusivity.").
143. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058-59 (2006) (stating that registration remains in force for ten years
and may be renewed for successive ten-year terms upon showing of continued use in commerce).
144. See id. § 1127 (stating that the source of trademark protection lies in the use or intent
to use in commerce).
145. See TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33 (outlining the standards under both subdoctrines).
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a. Utilitarian Functionality
Single-color fashion marks and their incorporation into a
product's design do not likely face invalidation due to utilitarian
functionality. A mark owner's successful demonstration that the
feature in question is "merely an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary
aspect of the device" will overcome this facet of the functionality
doctrine.146 Colors are primarily used in the fashion industry as
arbitrary embellishments.147 However, there are some examples in
which fashion marks would be denied protection under the doctrine of
utilitarian functionality. One of these rare instances would occur when
an individual seeks to register a trademark or attain trade dress
protection for the natural color of leather.148 The natural color of
leather (or any other material, for that matter) is a functional
attribute of the product. Thus, color in this instance may not serve as
a trademark or trade dress element because allowing such would
grant exclusive use of that leather in its natural color to the mark
owner and would render it inaccessible to the rest of the market. An
individual would be equally unsuccessful in an attempt to monopolize
black or dark colored outsoles on footwear; such colors provide the
utilitarian function of diminishing the shoes' "wear and tear" and
therefore affect the product's quality. 149
The Southern District of New York initially stated that
Louboutin's use of red on the shoe's outsole constituted an instance of
utilitarian functionality in that it "affects the cost of the shoe."150
While consumers are no doubt willing to pay a higher price for items
bearing luxury brand insignia, this interpretation of the functionality
doctrine appears to be inconsistent with the doctrine envisioned by
judicial precedent.' 5 ' In LeSportSac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., the Second
146. Id. at 30.
147. In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
148. See Master Distribs., Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219, 224 (8th Cir. 1993) ("[I]f color is
essential to the utility of a product or is the natural color of the product, then no party may
acquire exclusive trademark rights in that feature or color.").
149. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995) (stating that
trademark registration of color alone requires that the color not be functional); Inwood Labs.,
Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc, 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.10 (1982) ("[A] product feature is functional if it is
essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.").
150. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 454
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint
Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012); see also supra Part III.A (providing a
more detailed explanation of the court's reasoning).
151. See, e.g., TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33-34 (reiterating the functionality doctrine). In its
analysis of utilitarian functionality, the Southern District of New York explicitly notes its
departure from precedent. Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
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Circuit interpreted the "effect on cost" element of utilitarian
functionality to refer to a design feature that permits the product to be
manufactured at a lower cost.1 5 2 Applying a foreign color (such as a
specific shade of red) to a piece of clothing or accessory (such as the
outsole of a shoe) makes a product more costly to produce. Despite the
district court's argument that this "effect on cost" benefits luxury
fashion designers, 153 the ability to charge higher prices does not derive
primarily from the increase in manufacturing costs. Rather, the
ability to charge such a premium stems predominantly from the
notions of luxury and exclusivity created by high-fashion brands such
as Louboutin. This consumer desire to be associated with single-color
marks such as Louboutin's Red Sole Mark augments the
distinctiveness fashion marks can acquire and, therefore, reiterates
their function as valid source identifiers.
On appeal, the Second Circuit paid little attention to the
doctrine of utilitarian functionality. 154 It did not address the district
court's arguments that the Red Sole Mark was functional because it
"affected the cost" of the product or, more specifically, that it allowed
Louboutin to charge a premium. 155 However, in its brief treatment of
the subdoctrine, it directly quoted the language from LeSportSac: a
feature "affects the cost or quality of the article 'where it permits the
article to be manufactured at a lower cost.' "156 By including such
language, the Second Circuit implicitly rejected the district court's
earlier interpretation.
While utilitarian functionality may pose a surmountable threat
to a designer seeking trademark or trade dress protection for a single-
color design, the fashion industry's dedication to and reliance on
aesthetic appeal presents an additional, and even more challenging,
obstacle.
b. Aesthetic Functionality
With minimal guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts
continue to grapple with the doctrine of aesthetic functionality and
152. LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Warner Bros.
v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 331 (2d Cir. 1983)).
153. Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
154. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 219
(2d Cir. 2012).
155. Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
156. Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 219 (citing LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 76).
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have created divergent and inadequate tests.15 7 While it is unlikely
that a standardized approach will ultimately emerge, as the analysis
varies depending on the specific facts of each case and the competitive
needs of each consumer market, a more uniform understanding of the
doctrine is crucial. This is especially true for the issue at hand because
single-color marks are frequently denied protection due to their
aesthetic functions. Additionally, the fashion industry's focus on
aesthetic appeal presents a further obstacle with regard to this
subdoctrine: fashion marks more often than not attract consumers
both because of their pleasing looks and their identifications of a
coveted brand or source.
This Section begins with an analysis of the theory of color
depletion, the argument most commonly asserted against protection of
single-color marks. Next, it surveys the various approaches courts
have taken in evaluating the non-reputation-related purposes of color
marks, taking into account the need to incentivize and protect the
creation of aesthetically pleasing marks. While innovation in the
fashion industry is dependent on a designer's access to a sufficient
color palette with which to "paint," such creative need must be
balanced with the underlying policies of trademark law.
i. Color Depletion: Not a Significant Hindrance to Competition
Using the Second Circuit's formulation of the aesthetic
functionality doctrine, protection of one particular color on one part of
a product does not " 'significantly undermine competitors' ability to
compete in the relevant market."158 While color depletion is not a per
se claim of functionality, 15 9 the theory nonetheless remains relevant
within the functionality framework, particularly for industries such as
fashion, which rely so heavily on color.
The color depletion theory cautiously posits, "[I]f one of many
competitors can appropriate a particular color for use as a trademark,
157. See McKenna, supra note 76, at 824 ("Some courts refuse to recognize the aesthetic
functionality doctrine at all, and some courts that do recognize it are often reluctant to actually
find the features at issue functional, even when exclusive use of those features seems very likely
to put competitors at a significant, non-reputation-related disadvantage."); see also Au-Tomotive
Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2006) ("The results reached
in these various aesthetic functionality cases do not easily weave together to produce a coherent
jurisprudence, although as a general matter courts have been loathe to declare unique,
identifying logos and names as functional."); Moir, supra note 20, at 430 (stating that many
federal courts and the TTAB seem to reject, or at least question, the doctrine on the grounds that
it disincentivizes the creation of visually pleasing marks).
158. Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 222.
159. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 168-69 (1995) (noting that, if
color depletion were to arise, the functionality doctrine would seem to be available).
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and each competitor then tries to do the same, the supply of colors will
soon be depleted."160 Complicating this matter, "[tlhe effect on
competition is not a function of the range of designs that are
physically or conceptually possible; it is instead determined by the
number of alternative designs that would be accepted by consumers as
reasonable substitutes."'16 However, these legitimate worries are
alleviated when one considers the almost infinite choice of colors
available and the accepted practice of claiming only one specific shade
when creating source-identifying symbols. Considering the seasonal
use of most colors within the fashion industry, it is difficult to foresee
a time when designers will have claimed trademark or trade dress
rights to every imaginable color.
Anyone who has ever painted a room can attest to the infinite
and overwhelming range of paint-chip colors. The same holds for the
fashion industry-where new technologies in color dyeing lead to an
ever-increasing number of colors available for use.162 Although it is
true that not every hue will appeal to consumers, demand is largely
dictated by what popular brands (not customers) designate to be "in"
for a given season. Therefore, the range of colors at a designer's
disposal is not limited in this way. Additionally, registration of a mark
only minimally decreases access to color, as typically an applicant
applies for protection of a specific shade. 68 The Pantone Color System,
a commercial system that designates shades numerically and assists a
variety of creative and technological industries, is particularly useful
for those wishing to trademark a single color.16 4
In Louboutin, the district court worried that protecting
Louboutin's Red Sole Mark would usher in a "specter of fashion wars"
in which designers would stake claim to colors, ultimately resulting in
160. Id. at 168.
161. McKenna, supra note 76, at 846-47; see also Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 168 ("[In the context
of a particular product, only some colors are usable. By the time one discards colors that, say, for
reasons of customer appeal, are not usable . . then one is left with only a handful of possible
colors.").
162. In DAP Products, Inc. v. Color Tile Manufacturing, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 488, 495 (S.D.
Ohio 1993), the court rejected the theory of color depletion due to the fact that modern
technology has exponentially increased the number of different colors available. See also Master
Distribs., Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219, 225 (8th Cir. 1993) ("It is highly improbable that
every distinguishable color shade has already been selected and would be subject to trademark
protection.").
163. See Jerome Gilson & Anne Gilson LaLonde, Cinnamon Buns, Marching Ducks and
Cherry-Scented Racecar Exhaust: Protecting Nontraditional Trademarks, 95 TRADEMARK REP.
773, 776 (2005) (noting that descriptive imprecision tends to create enforcement difficulties).
164. Id. at 778-79; see also PANTONE, http://www.pantone.com/pages/pantone/index.aspx
(last visited Jan. 16, 2013) (advertising color-precision services).
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depletion. 165 While the above arguments indicate that this outcome is
unlikely, merely taking into account the fashion industry's ordinary
use of color as specific to one season or one ephemeral trend makes it
outright unfathomable.
The Eighth Circuit addressed color depletion in Master
Distributors, Inc. v. Pako Corp. Refusing to adopt a per se rule against
trademarking color, the court cabined the reach of the color depletion
theory: "Until secondary meaning has been established in every
distinguishable shade of color and in no color at all, a highly
improbable situation, there will always be an option available to a new
market entrant."66 Color depletion in the fashion industry seems
unlikely due to the fact that acquiring secondary meaning for a
particular color is extremely difficult. 167 Because most colors are
associated with seasonal trends, rather than consistently utilized to
indicate a particular source, this negative effect on competition does
not seem like a legitimate threat.168
The Second Circuit did not explicitly comment on the color
depletion argument in Louboutin. However, the court's formulation of
an aesthetic functionality doctrine that allows competitors sufficient
options to compete within a given market, rather than allowing them
the greatest range of choices, 169 evidences its lack of reliance on this
argument. The court understood that the protection of one particular
color on one part of a product does not "significantly undermine[]
competitors' ability to compete in the relevant market." 70
With respect to the related issue of shade confusion, courts
generally disregard this argument on the grounds that the issue is no
more burdensome on courts than the likelihood-of-confusion analysis
required for more traditional word marks.'71 Further, expert witnesses
are available to testify regarding similarity of colors.172
165. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 457
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff'd in part, reu'd in part sub nom. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint
Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012).
166. Master Distribs., 986 F.2d at 223.
167. See supra Part III.B.2 (noting that the acquisition of secondary meaning in the fashion
industry requires the color to be used for much longer than the typical period of one season or
fashion cycle).
168. See supra Part III.B.2 (highlighting the dual role of colors both as components of
seasonal designs and as source identifiers).
169. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 223-
24 (2d Cir. 2012).
170. Id. at 222.
171. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 167 (1995).
172. Master Distribs., Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219, 223-24 (8th Cir. 1993).
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In conclusion, while color is in many respects the "lifeblood" of
the fashion industry, a "specter of fashion wars" is an unlikely
consequence of granting protection to deserving brands.
ii. Marks that Are Equally Aesthetically Pleasing and Source
Identifying
A product attribute is not aesthetically functional simply
because it serves both ornamental and source-identifying purposes.173
While courts generally agree on this, the degree to which a particular
mark or product design may serve an aesthetic purpose is a point of
contention among the circuits. 174 Fortunately, the evolution of the
doctrine exhibits a gradual relaxation-an understanding that
consumer appeal and commercial success do not automatically render
a mark or design feature aesthetically functional. As initially
formulated, the doctrine of aesthetic functionality invalidated a mark
or design that was an "important ingredient" to the commercial
success of the product.175 This formulation permitted use of the feature
in the interest of free competition.176 Under this original standard,
fashion marks and designs would face an almost invariable fate of
invalidation since consumers at least in part choose a particular
article of clothing because of "the look." Today, such a fate has been
somewhat alleviated by the modern necessary-for-effective-
competition test, which the Supreme Court applied in Qualitex: a
mark is functional if "exclusive use of the feature would put
competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage."177
Notwithstanding this trend of relaxation, single-color marks
within the fashion industry still face heightened scrutiny due to their
aesthetic appeal and the fact that color largely serves an ornamental
purpose within the industry. In order to constitute a valid trademark
173. See LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 76-78 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that
source-identifying features on a bag may be nonfunctional even if the bag is purchased because
of its aesthetic features and its aesthetic features contribute to its commercial success); In re
Paramount Pictures Corp., 217 U.S.P.Q. 292, 293 (T.T.A.B. 1983) ("[Tlhe Lanham Act does not
exclude registration of a mark simply because it has an ornamental as well as a source-
indicating purpose.").
174. Compare SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1063 (3d Cir. 1980)
("Proof of nonfunctionality generally requires a showing that the element of the product serves
no purpose other than identification."), with Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd. v. Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 339
(7th Cir. 1998) ("[I]f consumers derive a value from the fact that a product looks a certain way
that is distinct from the value of knowing at a glance who made it, then it is a nonappropriable
feature of the product.").
175. Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952).
176. Id.
177. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995) (emphasis added).
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or trade dress, a single color's value to consumers must derive
sufficiently from its ability to identify a particular source.178
Courts have long acknowledged the difficulty in applying this
doctrine and the inability to create a bright-line rule due to its
context-specific nature:
Since the line distinguishing between mere ornamentation and ornamentation which is
merely an incidental quality of a trade-mark is not always clearly ascertainable, the
application of legal principles to fit one situation or the other requires proper reflection
upon the impression likely to govern the ordinary purchaser in the market place. For
that reason, the merits of each case of the character here presented must be individually
and accordingly adjudged.1 7 9
In Automotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., the Ninth
Circuit acknowledged the "somewhat checkered history" of the
doctrine of aesthetic functionality. 8 0 Refusing to uphold declaratory
relief for a maker of car accessories bearing exact replicas of
Volkswagen and Audi marks, the court warned that if left unfettered,
the aesthetic functionality doctrine could serve as a defense to
infringement when a mark constitutes the actual benefit the consumer
desires.181 Additionally, the court distinguished between logos or
insignia, which generally have no function apart from their
association with a trademark owner (e.g., extrinsic aesthetic appeal),
and certain shapes or "uses of color," which have intrinsic appeal
independent of an ability to identify a source.182
Within the fashion industry, color holds a great deal of intrinsic
aesthetic value. For example, if demand exists for red-soled shoes
178. See, e.g., LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 78 (reasoning that a mark is nonfunctional even if its
aesthetic features are also an important ingredient in the product's commercial success). In other
words, the consumer demand for the product must derive from the secondary meaning the mark
owner has cultivated through the consumer's use of the mark as a source identifier. Landes and
Posner provide a detailed explanation of the theory behind aesthetic functionality:
A more attractive mark is equivalent to a higher-quality good. So while a strong
trademark increases the price that consumers are willing to pay for the good by
lowering search costs, an attractive trademark raises price by increasing the utility
that consumers get from the good once they have bought it. Because a more attractive
mark will usually be more expensive to produce, the firm will invest in such a mark
only if it is rewarded by obtaining a higher price for each unit of the trademarked
good that it sells. And the higher the price, the more units the firm will produce. Thus,
the effect of giving the attractive trademark legal protection is to increase both the
quality and quantity of output, thereby benefiting consumers, rather than to reduce
output by raising rivals' costs, as in the case of utilitarian functionality.
Landes & Posner, supra note 21, at 296.
179. In re Swift & Co., 223 F.2d 950, 954 (C.C.P.A. 1955).
180. Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2006).
181. Id. The Ninth Circuit referred to this reading of the aesthetic functionality doctrine as
the "death knell for trademark protection," as it would mean that just because a consumer likes
a mark or finds it attractive, competitors could freely adopt it. Id.
182. Id. at 1073.
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unrelated to the reputation developed by Louboutin, the product
feature would be deemed functional.183 However, if the desire to own
such shoes is "tied to the reputation and association" with the brand,
signifying luxury and a chic lifestyle, the color serves a source-
identifying purpose.184 Here lies the issue: some consumers covet a
product because the color mark is aesthetically appealing, others
desire the same product because the color mark represents a
particular source, and still others purchase such a product because the
color mark is aesthetically appealing and simultaneously indicates a
specific source. Under a strict interpretation of the functionality
doctrine, a court would invalidate the Red Sole Mark because it serves
an aesthetic purpose, regardless of its source-identifying functions.
In Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enterprises, Inc., the Ninth
Circuit held that Louis Vuitton's trademark was nonfunctional,
despite the mark's contribution to the commercial success of the
product. 85 It reasoned that a trademark that contributes to the
commercial success of a product is not aesthetically functional if such
success derives from the mark's ability to indicate the product's
source. 86 Under this construction, the aesthetic appeal the mark
confers is merely incidental to its source-identifying function. 87 In
analyzing functionality, the court offered a helpful formulation:
If a group of consumers who had never heard of Louis Vuitton were choosing between
Vuitton goods and similar goods... would the consumers tend to choose the Vuitton
good or would they have any utilitarian reason for doing so? If the Vuitton mark
increases consumer appeal only because of the quality associated with Vuitton goods, or
because of the prestige associated with owning a genuine Vuitton product, then the
design is serving the legitimate function of a trademark.18 8
Thus, according to Automotive Gold and Vuitton, as a matter of law, a
product feature is not functional merely because it contributes to
consumer appeal and saleability. This formulation of the doctrine is
crucial for the survival of single-color marks within the fashion
industry.
183. Using the words iterated by the Supreme Court in Qualitex, there would have to be a
"significant non-reputation-related advantage." Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S.
159, 165 (1995).
184. Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1074.
185. Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1981).
186. Id. at 776.
187. Id. at 775; see also Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280
F.3d 619, 643-44 & n.18 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 346
(7th Cir. 1985)) (reasoning that a trade dress attribute is nonfunctional if it is "the kind of
merely incidental feature which gives the brand some individual distinction" (emphasis added)).
188. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 644 F.2d at 776.
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Further supporting a narrow reading of the doctrine of
aesthetic functionality is the fact that most trademarks are initially
chosen for the very reason that they are pleasing to consumers.189 A
strict application of this subdoctrine cuts against the broad definition
of a trademark articulated in the Lanham Act. It would disincentivize
the creation of attractive marks and could work to punish those who
create attractive and commercially successful marks, such as
Louboutin.190
Various circuits have argued for a narrower application of the
aesthetic functionality doctrine. For example, in Keene Corp. v.
Paraflex Industries, Inc., the Third Circuit held that the design of a
wall luminaire was functional due to limited alternatives.191
Nonetheless, the court called for protection of "imaginative and
attractive design" as to continue to encourage the "spark of originality
which could transform an ordinary product into one of grace." 192
This need to protect "imaginative design" carries heightened
significance for trademarks within the fashion industry due to the fact
that aesthetics are fundamental to a consumer's choice of what to
wear.193 Therefore, a balance must be reached between requiring that
marks sufficiently identify source, so as to not disadvantage
competition, and continuing to encourage the creation of appealing
marks by offering protection against infringement. 9 4 The following
Part will focus predominantly on formulating the inquiry of aesthetic
functionality to adequately serve the unique demands of the fashion
industry, because that doctrine is the greatest obstacle to protection
under the Lanham Act.
189. See Landes & Posner, supra note 21, at 295 (noting that the producer of a consumer
product will never deliberately "uglify" the product).
190. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 58, § 7:80 (citing In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042,
1053 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J., concurring)) ("No principle of trademark law required the
imposition of penalties for originality, creativeness, attractiveness, or uniqueness of one's
product.").
191. Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 827-28 (3d Cir. 1981).
192. Id. at 825.
193. See W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 340 (7th Cir. 1985) ("In an age when
fashion-conscious consumers wear t-shirts emblazoned with the trademarks of consumer
products....').
194. The Second Circuit pays lip service to this crucial balance: "[I]n determining whether a
mark has an aesthetic function so as to preclude trademark protection, we take care to ensure
that the mark's very success in denoting (and promoting) its source does not itself defeat the
markholder's right to protect that mark." Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am.
Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 222 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v.
Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1990)).
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IV. A TAILORED LOOK
Although the definition of a trademark encompasses a wide
variety of source-identifying symbols and devices, designers face
various obstacles in their attempts to attain and later maintain
protection of their single-color marks. The fashion industry's
fundamental reliance on color and aesthetically appealing designs
complicates the analysis of a trademark's or trade dress's
distinctiveness and nonfunctionality. 195 While the preservation of
creative options is crucial to free competition and to the future of the
fashion industry in general, such a concern should not overshadow
those instances in which single-color fashion marks have genuinely
acquired secondary meaning and are nonfunctional.
This Part proposes a flexible inquiry into- the validity of a
fashion mark. Because consumers more often than not select a fashion
product based equally on aesthetic appeal and association with a
particular brand, the crux of this solution lies with a relaxation of the
aesthetic functionality doctrine. This Part begins by suggesting that
mark owners limit the scope of their single-color marks to avoid a
court's modification similar to that in Louboutin. It then offers a form
of functionality analysis that better balances the competing interests
of mark owners and competitors.
A. Limiting the Scope of the Mark
Since designers usually use a particular color or design for only
a given season, most uses of color within the fashion industry would
fail to acquire secondary meaning in the minds of consumers.196 Such
ephemeral glimpses of a given color or design do not rise to the level of
the consistent use needed to establish secondary meaning.197 Affording
trademark protection in the rare occasion in which a designer has
maintained the use of a specific color across seasons does not
significantly affect creative liberty or competition.
195. In regard to clothing designs seeking trade dress validity, the Supreme Court had
'little confidence that a reasonably clear test can be devised." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara
Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000).
196. Cf. Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938) (noting that a long period
of time was required in order for consumers to attribute a secondary meaning to "Shredded
Wheat").
197. See, e.g., Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929, 937 (6th Cir. 1999)
(arguing that "exclusivity, length, and manner of use" must be considered in determining
whether secondary meaning has been achieved), rev'd on other grounds, TrafFix Devices, Inc. v.
Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
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Turning to the requirement of nonfunctionality, limiting the
scope of a single-color mark is essential to a trademark owner's ability
to gain and maintain protection.198 In other words, sustained
trademark protection for single-color marks relies on limiting the
trademark's scope to that which is completely necessary to cover a
designer's intended uses on products. The broader and less defined the
mark, the more likely a particular mark will be held to be functional
and therefore "unprotectable" under trademark law.199 For example, in
Jay Franco & Sons, Inc. v. Franek, a trademark for a circular beach
towel-a basic shape and thus a very broad claim-significantly
hindered competition and was therefore found to be functional.2 00 It
follows that a fashion brand seeking to trademark a single color must
limit the scope of the mark by limiting it to a specific color, a specific
medium, and a specific market.
Because the threat of color depletion is commonly asserted
against protection of single-color marks, a mark owner must claim
ownership of a particular shade.201 This can be achieved by claiming a
recognized numerically identified color from the Pantone Color
System. Doing so "depletes" the available colors by only one shade of a
particular color. Claiming use of the color on a particular medium,
such as the outsole of a high-heeled shoe, further diminishes the
threat of color depletion (and thereby decreases the chances of a
finding of invalidity) due to the fact that competitors are free to use
that particular shade on all parts of their products other than that
protected by the trademark. 202 Lastly, the market in which the single-
color trademark exists should be narrowly defined (for example, as
women's high-fashion, high-heeled shoes) as the fashion industry is
highly segregated into submarkets by price points, product types, and
target consumers. 203
198. See Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 381 (2d Cir. 1997)
(reversing preliminary injunction because plaintiff had not articulated and supported its claimed
inherently distinctive trade dress with sufficient particularity).
199. See id. ("[A] plaintiffs inability to explain to a court exactly which aspects of its product
design(s) merit protection may indicate that its claim is pitched at an improper level of
generality, i.e., the claimant seeks protection for an unprotectable style, theme or idea.").
200. Jay Franco & Sons, Inc. v. Franek, 615 F.3d 855, 860 (7th Cir. 2010).
201. See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 454
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) ("Louboutin's claim to 'the color red' is, without some limitation, overly broad
and inconsistent with the scheme of trademark registration established by the Lanham Act.").
202. Courts have previously upheld such positional uses of color. See, e.g., Keds Corp. v.
Renee Int'l Trading Corp., 888 F.2d 215, 221 (1st Cir. 1989) (upholding protection of blue
rectangle placed on canvas shoes); Registration No. 2,851,315 (red longitudinal heel stripe of
Prada S.A.).
203. 3 Louis ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS
AND MONOPOLIES § 19:79 (4th ed. 2003) ("[Flunctionality ... is not to be determined within the
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B. Balancing "Buying the Brand" and "Buying the Look"
As evidenced by Christian Louboutin's initial decision to add
the color red to the outsoles of his shoes, a given color can say a lot. In
addition to signifying its source, a specific color can give a product
energy, while another may make a product more refined, and yet
another may suggest a look of understatedness or neutrality. 204
Analysis of a fashion mark's aesthetic functionality begins with the
acknowledgement that the fashion industry presents a unique
conundrum: with any given article of clothing, pair of shoes, or
accessory, some consumers decide to buy the item because the color
mark makes the product aesthetically appealing, while other
consumers decide to buy the item because the color mark identifies a
particular brand with which such consumers desire to be associated.
These non-reputation-related and source-identifying purposes are
equally significant and thus suggest that the fashion industry needs
its own version of the aesthetic functionality doctrine. Under the
traditional aesthetic functionality analysis, a court concludes that a
mark is functional, and therefore invalid, if these consumer
preferences are in equipoise; policy dictates that competition is
hindered by a monopoly over aesthetically pleasing features, and
therefore trademark law denies protection to such features. However,
an optimal solution would not automatically invalidate such marks
due to their simultaneous roles, but rather would implement a more
industry-specific balancing of consumer decisions and competitive
costs.
The easy cases would benefit from a more lenient functionality
standard similar to that utilized by the Ninth Circuit in Vuitton et
Fils.205 For example, the standard could be presented as the following
test: "If Fashion Brand X's single-color mark or identifying use of color
increases consumer appeal only because of the quality associated with
Brand X's goods, or because of the prestige associated with owning a
genuine Brand X product, then the single-color mark or identifying
use of color is serving a legitimate function of a trademark."206 This
strikes a balance by affording protection to those rare marks that
satisfy this high bar (thereby incentivizing future creation of highly
broad compass of different but interchangeable products; the doctrine of functionality is intended
to preserve competition within the narrow bounds of each individual product market.").
204. See supra Part III.A (detailing what Louboutin thought the color red added to his
shoes).
205. Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 776 (9th Cir. 1981).
206. Id.
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successful and aesthetically pleasing marks), while simultaneously
preserving creative sources and ongoing competition.
The more difficult cases, in which a mark's value is equally
attributable to its aesthetic appeal and association with a specific
source, would require the court to balance the needs of competitors
with those of the mark owner. This balancing test would take into
account what drives consumers to purchase a particular product.
Salience of a given color mark-in essence, the degree of acquired
distinctiveness-can be gleaned from evidence already provided to the
court for the purposes of proving secondary meaning. 207 For those
marks that have successfully attained secondary meaning, such
evidence would also show the relative aesthetic or source-identifying
impact a mark has on a consumer's purchase.
As stated by the Second Circuit, determining a mark's
functionality or lack thereof is a very fact-specific inquiry; this is
especially true for fashion marks.208 With this in mind, a court
charged with such a task must inquire into the particularized
interests of the parties involved. In analyzing a fashion mark's
validity, a court should ask two questions:
(1) Why does a mark owner seek exclusive use of a color mark?
(2) Why do competitors seek free use and access to that same
color mark?
If the answers to these questions reveal that both interests are
largely grounded in the acquired meaning the mark owner has
created, this weighs against a finding of functionality. Alternatively, if
such source-identifying purposes are secondary to aesthetic or other
non-reputation-related advantages, a mark is likely functional. In
summary, a relaxed inquiry into a mark's aesthetic functionality can
account for the unique features of a single-color fashion mark, which
often cause consumers to seek out "the look" and "the brand" in equal
measure.
V. TREND FORECASTING
Despite the Second Circuit's holding allowing Louboutin's
modified Red Sole Mark to serve as a valid trademark, many
questions still remain with respect to the fashion industry's potential
for increased intellectual property protection. Fortunately, it is safe to
207. See supra Part II.B.1 (detailing the direct and circumstantial evidence necessary to
prove a given mark has acquired secondary meaning).
208. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 222
(2d Cir. 2012).
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say that single-color fashion marks may warrant protection and are
not categorically invalid. But the certainty of the industry's
intellectual property status stops here, as the Second Circuit
sidestepped the more challenging issue of functionality by deciding the
case on the mark's lack of distinctiveness when used on a
monochromatic shoe. Furthermore, a footnote within the opinion once
again illustrates the puzzling position the fashion industry inhabits
within the realm of intellectual property: "It is arguable that, in the
particular circumstances of this case, the more appropriate vehicle for
the protection of the Red Sole Mark would have been copyright rather
than trademark."209 Such an afterthought seems for the most part
irreconcilable with copyright law's denial of protection to "useful
articles" such as clothing.210 Until legislation such as the IDPA
successfully modifies U.S. copyright law, the uncertainty will remain.
In the meantime, formulating a relaxed and more
accommodating inquiry into the aesthetic functionality of single-color
fashion marks provides mark owners some repose from the "death
knell for trademark protection."2 11 Allowing trademark protection for
those features that both aesthetically appeal to consumers and signify
a specific source incentivizes the continued creation of attractive
fashion products.
Emilie Winckel*
209. Id. at 223 n.19.
210. See supra Part II (explaining the meager copyright protection afforded to the fashion
industry).
211. Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2006).
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